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Choice of Forum and Choice of Law in
the Federal Courts: A Reconsideration

of Erie Principles
By EARL M. MALTZ*

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of Erie Railroadv Tompkins ' is one of the central
features of federal jurisprudence. Erie established new principles
to govern cases in which federal jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship. Purporting to interpret both Article III of the Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act, 2 the Supreme Court held
in Erie that in diversity cases the federal district courts should
follow the substantive law of the states in which they sit. 3 Subsequent cases, however, have made it clear that procedural issues in
diversity cases remain subject to uniform federal law.
Since Erie, the Court and commentators have struggled to
define the appropriate standard that distinguishes between substantive and procedural issues. In Guaranty Trust Co. v York, 4 the
majority stated that the test was whether the rule being applied
was "outcome determinative."1 5 Later, Byrd v Blue Ridge
Cooperative' indicated that the federal courts should adopt a balancing analysis. Finally, m Hanna v Plumer,7 the Court returned
to a modified outcome determinative standard. Commentators on
Erie issues have been similarly divided. 8

* Professor of Law, Rutgers Umversity. B.A. 1972, Northwestern Umversity; J.D.
1975, Harvard Umversity. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of
Professor Allen Stein, and the financial support provided by a summer research grant from
Rutgers Law School.
1 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
'Ene Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

4 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
5 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
6 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
7 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
1 See, e.g., M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN THE ALLOCATION or JUDiciL PowER
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This Article provides a new perspective on the controversy over
the Erie doctrine. The Article begins by reviewing the various
positions taken by both the cases and commentators that have
discussed the problem. 9 It argues that each of these positions is
flawed, and describes a new approach based on the interaction
between the doctrine of enumerated powers and the policies underlying the specific decision to grant Congress the power to vest
the federal courts with diversity junsdiction. 10 The Article then
applies the analysis to two controversial issues: the role of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in the federal courts, and the
problem of choice of law 1
I.

A.

THE ERIE

DOCTRINE-CURRENT APPROACHES

Case Law and Commentary-An Overview

Analysis of the role of state law in diversity actions must begin
with Erie. Erie was a common law negligence action brought by a
Pennsylvania resident against a New York corporation. Under the
preexisting rule of Swift v Tyson,'12 the action would have been
governed by federal common law Overruling Swift, the Erie Court
held that state law provided the appropriate standard for decision. 3
The majority deployed a variety of arguments in support of its
conclusion. The opimon first contended that the Swift approach
created both undesirable forum shopping and unfair discrimination
between diverse and nondiverse parties.14 Next, the Court argued
169-205 (Ist ed. 1980) ("refined balancing test"); Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion
and Federal Common Law: Toward a General Approach, 70 CoRN. L. Rav. 625 (1985)

(federal common law should be related to federal statutes); Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of
Erie, 87 I-ARv L. Rav. 693 (1974) (fairness based considerations); Freer, Erie's Mid-Life

Crisis, 63 Tin.. L. Rav 1087 (1989) (use of stricter Erie doctrine); Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And of the New FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv 383 (1964) (formulation

of new federal common law); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw U.L.
REv. 427 (1958) (constitutional basis of Erie doctrine); Leathers, Erie and its Progeny as
Choice of Law Cases, 11 Hous. L. R-v. 791 (1974) (apply modern choice of law principles);

Westen and Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity, 78 MicH. L.
REv. 311 (1980) (emphasis on validity of federal rule).
9 See infra notes 12-49 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
1, See infra notes 58-115 and accompanying text.
12 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
11Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938).
14 Id. at 74-77.
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that Swift had misinterpreted the Rules of Decision Act, which
provides that "[t]he laws of the several states, except where federal
laws otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
15
decision in the civil actions in the courts of the Umted States."
Finally, the opimon argued that the Swift rule was unconstitutional
because it "invaded rights which
are reserved by the Consti16
tution to the several states."
Erie itself dealt with a clearly substantive rule of law It plainly
was not intended to prevent federal courts from adopting uniform
procedural rules. The difficulty is that some rules have both substantive and procedural aspects. The Court has vacillated somewhat
in its analysis of these rules.
Guaranty Trust Co. v York 17 was the first major effort to
describe generally applicable principles for distinguishing between
substantive and procedural rules for Erie purposes. York was a
diversity action filed in a district court in New York. The action
sought equitable relief for an alleged breach of trust. The state
statute of limitations precluded the suit in state court and, under
then-uniformly accepted choice-of-law principles, such rules generally were viewed as procedural.' The Court held that in such an
action, the federal courts were required to apply the statute of
limitations that would govern an analogous action in New York
state court.' 9 In reaching this conclusion, the majority relied on
the "outcome determination" test, asserting that
The intent of [Erie] was to insure that, m all cases where a federal
court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of
•citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the
federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal
rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried
in a State court. 2°
Byrd v Blue Ridge Cooperative2l took a different approach.
Byrd was a negligence action brought by a South Carolina resident
who had been injured while working for an electric power company Under South Carolina law, if the plaintiff had been a statIs28

U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).

16Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.

17326 U.S. 99 (1945).
§ 603 (1934).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945).
0 Id. at 109.
2- 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
s RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW

"
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utory "employee" of the power company, Is sole remedy was an
action under the state's workers' compensation scheme. Under state
law, the question of the plaintiff's status would have been determined by the judge. Under federal practice, by contrast, the plaintiff's status was to be determined by a jury. The Court conceded
that a straightforward application of the outcome determination
test would have required the federal courts to follow state practice.2 Nonetheless, the majority held that the plaintiff was entitled
to a jury determination of his status.3
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a balancing
test. The Court concluded that the state's choice to allow the judge
to determine the plaintiff's status was not intimately bound up
with the rights and obligations of the parties, but was "merely a
form and mode of enforcing the immumty." ' While conceding
that South Carolina had some interest in maintaimng its allocation
of the decision-making function, the majority argued that the
federal rule reflected an essential characteristic of the federal judicial system. 25 Thus, the opimon concluded that federal law rather
than state law should govern the issue of who had decision-making
power to determine the plaintiff's status.
Neither York nor Byrd dealt with the impact of the Rules
Enabling Act on Erie analysis. This statute grants the Supreme
Court power "to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure
in the United States district courts," but also provides that
"[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantiveright." 26 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [the Rules] were
adopted pursuant to this authority. Hanna v Plumer2 7 outlines the
current framework for analysis when the Rules conflict with state
law
Hanna involved a dispute over the proper mode of service of
process in diversity actions. The relevant state rule required inhand service. The Rules, by contrast, allowed service at the "dwelling house" of the defendant. 28 Applying a Byrd-type balancing
test, the district court held the state rule applicable. The Supreme
Court unaimously reversed. 29
22

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).

Id. at 538.
24 Id. at 536.
23

Id. at 538-39.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
- FED. R. Crv. P 4(d)(1).
2Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965).
21
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In its discussion of Erie principles, the Hanna Court seemed
to endorse a version of the outcome determination test, but noted
that the test "cannot be read without reference to the twin aims
of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance
of inequitable admnistration of the laws." 30 If a federal rule
adopted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act was involved, the
Court stated that the federal rule should be applied so long as it
was "rationally capable of classification as procedural." 3 '
The rigors of the Hanna approach were softened somewhat by
the subsequent decision of Walker v Armco Steel Co. 32 In Walker,
the issue was the date when an action was "commenced" for
purposes of satisfying the statute of limitations. Under state law,
an action was not deemed commenced for statute of limitations
purposes until service of a summons on the defendant. 3 By contrast, rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a
civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint. 34 A unammous Court held that state law governed the statute of limitations
question, noting that "there is no indication that the Rule was
intended to toll a state statute of limitations, '35 and suggested that
a federal rule should not be held to displace a state standard unless
'36
the "plain meaning" of the rule makes a clash "unavoidable.
Taken as a whole, the case law on the Erie doctrine reflects
the two different themes featured prominently in Erie itself. Cases
such as York and Hanna emphasized the unfairness of the Swift
v. Tyson rule to the party who is forced to litigate in federal court.
By contrast, Byrd focused almost entirely on a perceived conflict
between state and federal interests.
Commentators are similarly divided into two camps. One group,
37
led by John Hart Ely, emphasizes fairness-based considerations.
The other group, including David Currie and Martin Redish, is
primarily concerned with issues of federalism. 3 None of the models
that have been suggested provides a full justification for the Erie
doctrine.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 472.
32 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
" OKA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 (1971).
3'

3

3'

FED. R. Civ P 3.
Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980) (footnote omitted).

Id. at 749-50 n.9.
See Ely, supra note 8, at 724-25.
3, See R. CRAMPTON, D. CuRuua & H. KAY, CONFuCT OF LAWS: CAsEs-CoMNTSQUESTIONS 795 (4th ed. 1987); Redish, supra note 8, at 169-205.
31
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The Erie Doctrine and Litigant Fairness
a. Forum Shopping

The crudest form of the litigant fairness argument focuses on
the danger of forum shopping. This argument rests on the view
that it is unfair to allow a nonresident to "shop" between state
and federal courts in order to obtain legal doctrine more favorable
to his case. The fear of forum shopping underlay the Supreme
Court's endorsement of the modified outcome determination test
in Hanna v Plumer3 9
The difficulty with the forum shopping argument is that it
proves too much. By its nature, establishing diversity jurisdiction
in the judicial system will give some parties the power to choose
between state courts and federal courts. Faced with that choice, a
rational person will forum shop-that is, choose the most advantageous forum. Thus, the forum shopping argument is not merely
an argument against the rule of Swift v Tyson; it is an attack on
the institution of diversity jurisdiction generally 4 If diversity jurisdiction is to be retained, the forum shopping argument only has
force if one can show that choosing a forum to obtain a favorable
choice of law is somehow more unfair than choosing a court to
obtain some other advantage.
b.

The Quasi-EqualProtection Justification

Perhaps cognizant of the weakness of the generalized attack
on forum shopping, Ely focuses on the quasi-equal protection
strand of the Erie opinion. He claims that the doctrine is best
understood as being aimed at "the unfairness of subjecting a
person involved in litigation with a citizen of a different state to a
body of law different from that which applies when his next door
'4
neighbor is involved in similar litigation with a cocitizen." 1
Despite its facial appeal, this argument also fails to adequately
justify the rejection of Swift v Tyson. The Erie rule makes a
difference only when the courts of the forum state apply a rule
that the federal courts would view as unfair Otherwise, even under
a system that rejected Erie, the federal court would independently

1,380

U.S. at 467-68.
Ely, supra note 8,at 710.
11Id. at 712.
40
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adopt the forum state rule. Thus, in essence, the party in litigation
with a noncitizen is contending that because he would gain an
unfair advantage in a lawsuit with a cocitizen, he should also be
allowed to enjoy that same advantage in an analogous lawsuit with
a noncitizen. This argument is not terribly appealing. In short,
neither of the faimrness-based arguments justifies the abandonment
of Swift.
2.

Federalism-BasedArguments

a.

The ConstitutionalArgument

The Erie majority claimed that its conclusion was constitutionally-mandated by the doctrine of enumerated powers. 42 Even in the
context of early-twentieth century constitutional jurisprudence, this
claim was questionable. Normally a court that has jurisdiction over
a cause of action also has the authority to deterrmne the legal rules
governing that cause of action. Moreover, nothing m the text of
Article III takes that power away from the federal courts in diversity cases. Thus, even if the legislative power of Congress were
otherwise limited, the power to enforce Article III would give the'
federal courts the authority to create common law
43
As Ely notes, the Erie constitutional analysis is outdated.
Under current constitutional law, Congress, through its expansive
power over commerce, could regulate most matters traditionally
left to state control." Given this authority, Congress could also
grant the federal courts power to fashion common law to govern
these issues. 45 Thus, the doctrine of Swift .v Tyson clearly would
be acceptable under modern constitutional analysis.
b. The "False Conflict" Argument
David Currie argues that Erie problems create what modern
choice of law scholars describe as false conflicts between state and
42304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893)
(Field, J., dissenting)).
,' Ely, supra note 8, at 702-04.
"See, e.g., Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)
(regulation of local utilities); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n.,
452 U.S. 264 (1981) (land use planmng).
41 See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (by virtue
of statute, federal common law governs interpretation of collective bargaining agreement).
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federal law He suggests that only the governments of the states
whose residents are involved have interests in the substantive outcome of the litigation. He contends that the interest of the federal
government is only in creating an impartial forum. Currie concludes that the lack of a federal interest in the underlying substantive law justifies the Erie doctrine. 46
The difficulty with Currie's analysis is that it assumes that the
federal government has no interest in the substantive outcome of
diversity litigation. In diversity of citizenship litigation, both the
plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of the United States, and
the federal government has an interest in seeing that justice is given
to each party The fact that Congress may not have adopted a
specific statute does not vitiate this interest. Thus, diversity cases
m general cannot accurately be characterized as creating false conflicts.
c.

The Balancing Test

Martin Redish urges adoption of a more sophisticated analysis
of the relationship between state and federal interests. Taking Byrd
as a starting point, Redish advocates a "refined balancing test" to
resolve Erie issues dealing with arguably procedural rules. On the
federal side, he would consider only the interest in "avoiding
significant cost or inconvemence to the federal courts that would
accompany the application of a particular state procedural rule." 47
Redish would balance this federal interest against whatever state
policy underlies the rule at issue. 4
Although more plausible than the Currie analysis, Redish's
approach also faces serious theoretical difficulties. One problem,
endemic to balancing approaches generally, is that they call on
courts to compare values that are essentially incommensurable. For
example, one cannot accurately compare the weight of a federal
interest in cost avoidance with the interest of a state in doing
justice. Even more importantly, the two sovereigns whose interests
are involved are not of equal stature. To the extent that their
interests truly conflict, the supremacy clause of the Constitution
mandates preference for the federal government. Thus, state interests per se cannot constrain the federal courts. 49

"R. CRAMpTON, D. CuRP, & H. KAY, supra note 38, at 795.
-' Redish, supra note 8, at 195.
4 Id.
at 197-98.
41 Westen and Lehman, supra note 8, at 314.
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The latter point is particularly critical to an understanding of
the relationship between state and federal law in diversity cases.
Since state governments have no constitutional authority to control
the functionmg of the federal courts, the proper analysis of Erie
questions must be derived from federal sources alone. The next
section of this Article examines the relevant federal policies.
B.

The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of the Constitution

The proper analysis of Erie issues begins with an examination
of the nature of the federal government created by the Constitution. As already noted, the Constitution per se does not require
rejection of the doctrine of Swift v Tyson.50 But in the absence
of an expression of contrary congressional intent, it is clearly
desirable for the federal courts to adopt an approach that is consistent with the basic structure of the document that created them.
The drafters of the Constitution were faced with two competing
considerations. On one hand, the framers sought to establish a
government that was strong enough to serve certain important
purposes. On the other hand, they were concerned about the potential dangers of centralizing too much power at the national
level, fearing that such a concentration would unduly reduce the
authority of the state governments and generally threaten the liberty
of the citizenry In an effort to accommodate both concerns, the
drafters created a federal government of enumerated powers and,
in the tenth amendment, reserved all residual authority to the
states. Madison emphasized this point in The Federalist No. 46,
noting that under the Constitution, "all the more domestic and
personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided
for"'- by the state governments. In other words, the existence of
the federal government was not intended to change the legal incidents and consequences of normal, day-to-day relationships between citizens.
Article III is a typical example of the concept of enumerated
powers. Article III does not allow the creation of federal courts
with general jurisdiction. Instead, the Constitution grants federal
jurisdiction only in specifically-defined cases where state courts are
viewed as inadequate. The jurisdictional grant is a classic example
of what the author will label the "limited impact theory"-the

See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
5,TE FEmERALIST No. 46, at 314 (J. Madison) (Van Doren ed. 1945).

-
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principle that federal instrumentalities should have only a limited
impact on the overall process of governing the nation.
The diversity clause poses particularly difficult problems for
this principle. In diversity cases, the federal courts take cognizance
of substantive issues that are not directly related to any subject
over which the federal government generally is granted control.
The FederalistNo. 80 describes the rationale for this jurisdictional
grant by reference to the privileges and immunities clause of Article
IV [the comity clause]:
[I]n order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be
entitled [by the comity clause], the national judiciary ought to
preside in all cases in which one
State or its citizens are opposed
52
to another State or its citizens.
The diversity clause was thus seen as a way to guarantee the fair
treatment of litigants who are not residents of the state that is the
situs of the litigation.
In one sense, the rule of Swift v Tyson did serve this purpose.
Admittedly, under Swift the claims of nonresidents might be judged
by a different standard from those applicable to residents of the
forum state. But at least the process by which the standard was
determined was fair. Thus, neither the resident nor the nonresident
could complain because the presumably unbiased federal judge
determined that some rule of law was more just than that applied
53
to similar claims by the resident's home state courts.
The difficulty with the Swift rule is that it goes beyond the
policies that justify diversity jurisdiction. The comity clause generally was understood to require only that states grant the same
basic rights to transients as to their own citizens.5 4 Thus, the grant
of federal jurisdiction is in essence a nondiscrimination clause,
designed to guarantee that citizens of state A involved in litigation
in state B will be treated no worse than citizens of state B litigating
in their home courts.
This policy can be fully effectuated by adopting what might be
described as the principle of equality-the theory that a state A
citizen should have the same rights in a diversity action in federal
52THE FEDERALiST No. 80, at 353 (A. Hamilton) (Van Doren ed. 1945).
13 Ely, supra note 8, at 713.
4 Maitz, FourteenthAmendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. op LEG.
HIST. 305, 334-39 (1988).
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courts in state B that a citizen of state B would have in the courts
of his home state. Obviously, a state A citizen is being treated as
well as state B citizens litigating in state B courts if the legal rules
applied to the state A citizen are no different than those applied
generally by the state B courts. At the same time, this approachcaptured in broad outline by the Erie doctnne-nmnmuzes the role
of the federal government in defimng substantive rights of citizens
in their day-to-day activities. Thus, this approach also comports
with the limited impact principle.
This argument does not imply that federal adoption of the
principle of equality is constitutionally mandated. As already noted,
the jurisdictional grant in Article III implies a concomitant power
to define independently common law rules. The existence of a
power to define legal rules, however, does not imply that in each
case a court will ignore the law of other jurisdictions; indeed, state
courts commonly borrow the substantive rules of other jurisdictions
through the application of choice of law doctrines. Given that the
principle of equality effectuates both the policy underlying the
diversity clause and the more general structure of the Constitution
as a whole, it makes sense in common law diversity cases for the
federal courts to adopt a choice of law analysis that will effectuate
that principle.
This conclusion also draws support from the text of the Rules
of Decision Act, which provides that "[t]he laws of the several
States . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions,
in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply -55
On its face, the language seems to endorse the limited impact
theory by closely circumscribing the lawmaking authority of the
federal courts. Of course, the statutory command is not absolute;
even those who give the Rules of Decision Act the broadest reading
concede that purely procedural matters should be governed by
federal law 56 Moreover, the language of the Act can be interpreted
to allow the creation of federal common law in other circumstances. 57 But combined with the other factors discussed above, the
existence of the statute adds force to the arguments for the equality
principle.

,328 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
5 Redish, Federal Common Law, PoliticalLegitimacy, and the InterpretativeProcess:

An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw U.L. REv. 761, 787 n.103 (1989).

11E.g., Westen and Lehman, supra note 8, at 316; Weinberg, Federal Common Law,
83 Nw U.L. Rnv. 805 (1989).
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Similar analysis suggests that the Walker Court adopted a
proper approach to the interpretation of the Rules. Admittedly,
the Court could have legally adopted a uniform federal rule on
service of process that would have overridden contrary state law
But given the centrality of the limited impact theory to the entire
concept of federal jurisdiction, the rules should be interpreted to
preserve that principle if at all possible. Thus, the overriding mfluence of the limited impact theory justifies the Walker analysis.
In short, in resolving Erie problems, the federal courts should
seek to accommodate both the limited impact theory and the
principle of equality The remainder of this Article explores that
approach in the context of two controversial issues-the doctrine
of forum non conveniens and the question of choice of law rules.
II.
A.

THE Erie Doctrine and Forum Non Conveniens

Forum Non Conveniens in the Federal.Courts-An Overview

For nearly half a century, federal judges have recognized the
concept of forum non conveniens as grounds for the dismissal of
diversity cases. Gulf Oil Corp. v Gilberts firmly established the
doctrine in the federal courts. 59 Gilbert began as a diversity action
filed by a Virginia resident against a Pennsylvaia corporation.
The complaint was based on a Virginia fire that had allegedly been
caused by the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff sued in a New
York federal district court.
The Supreme Court upheld a district court judgment dismissing
the claim under the forum non conveniens doctnne ° Justice Jackson conceded that the choice of an otherwise appropriate forum
by the plaintiff should rarely be disturbed, but he argued that the
doctrine of forum non convemens was necessary to prevent the
harassment of defendants by plaintiffs who deliberately choose
inconvenient forums.6 1 While emphasizing the discretion of the trial
court was emphasized, Jackson identified two types of relevant
factors. First, he discussed "private" factors:

58330 U.S. 501 (1947).
,9 For a detailed discussion of the history of the doctnne of forum non convemens,
see Stein, Forum Non Convemens and the Redundancy of Court Access Doctrine, 133 U.
PA. L. REv 781 (1985).
60 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 512 (1947).
6 Id. at 508.
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Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources
of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaimng attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also
be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained. 62
The opinion also addressed a number of "public" factors that the
Court deemed relevant to the forum non conveniens issue:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is
piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its
origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon
the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.
In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason
for holding the trial m their view and reach rather than in remote
parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only
There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided
at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of
a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law
that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some
other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law
foreign to itself. 63
Shortly after the Gilbert decision, Congress adopted 28 U.S.C.
section 1404(a) as part of the Judicial Code governing actions in
federal court. Section 1404(a) provides that "[flor the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."64 The official comments to the statute
make clear that Congress believed that it was simply codifying the
Gilbert doctrine. 65 It soon became clear, however, that section
1404(a) was something more than forum non conveniens-and also

something less.
Norwood v Kirkpatrick" began the process of distinguishing

between forum non conveniens and section 1404(a). In Norwood,
three railroad workers, a Pennsylvania resident and two residents

62

Id.

Id. at 508-09.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
rId.
349 U.S. 29 (1955).
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of the District of Columbia, were injured in a derailment accident
in South Carolina. The plaintiffs sued the railroad company under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, filing their actions in federal
district court in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The trial court transferred the suit to South Carolina under section 1404(a). Upholding
the transfer, the Supreme Court held that section 1404(a) permitted
district courts to transfer actions upon a lesser showing of inconvemence than was needed to justify a dismissal on forum non
conventens grounds. The majority reasoned that since Section 1404(a)
did not require dismissal of the action, it was a less harsh remedy
than its common law counterpart. The Court concluded a 1404(a)
transfer should be available in some circumstances where a forum
non conveniens dismissal would be inappropriate.67
Although Norwood clearly held that section 1404(a) transfers
might be available in some cases where the doctrine of forum non
conventens was unavailable, in other contexts forum non conveniens is the only remedy available to one who seeks escape from an
inconvement forum. The most obvious example is the situation
where the alternative is litigation in a foreign country No federal
transferee forum exists outside the borders of the United States.
Thus, section 1404(a) cannot be applied in those cases.
Additionally, some potential domestic transfers also fall outside
the ambit of section 1404(a). The language of the statute allows
transfers of an action only to a district "where it might have been
brought. ' 6 1 In Hoffman v Blask, 69 the Court held that this provision precluded granting a defendant's motion for transfer to a
district that lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant and
where venue would have been improperly laid, notwithstanding the
fact that the defendant could have waived both objections. The
majority thus limited the applicability of section 1404(a) to those
districts where no federally-created barrier inhibited the plaintiff's
70
right to bring the action.
Section 1404(a) is not only geographically more limited than
forum non conveniens. Transfer under the statute has fewer consequences than its common law analogue. Basically, a change in
forum may alter the course of a lawsuit in two different ways.
First, it will change the physical location of the courtroom. Second,

Norwood v. Kirkpatnck, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).
- 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
- 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
70 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960).
67
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the change in forum may lead to a change in the rules that govern
the conduct and outcome of the suit. A forum non conveniens
dismissal may result in both types of change; by contrast, the
Supreme Court has held in Van Dusen v Barrack7' and Ferens v
John Deere Co.7 2 that a section 1404(a) transfer should have no
impact on the. applicable law
In short, the federal court analysis of forum non conveniens
issues involves a complicated interaction between statutory and
common law doctrines. It is not surprising that the proper appli7
cation of the Erie doctrine to the statutory and common law
motions raises difficult issues. The next subsection addresses these
issues.
B.

The Application of the Erie Doctrine
1. Section 1404(a) Transfers

By their very nature, section 1404(a) transfer motions potentially create tensions with the theory of limited impact. These
tensions could be dissolved by simply interpreting the statute to
direct federal courts to apply the forum non conveniens rules of
the states in which they sit. Unfortunately, such an interpretation
would be at odds with the structure of the statute itself. Admittedly, the Reviser's Notes do indicate that section 1404(a) was
intended to codify the forum non conventens doctrine. However,
other factors clearly indicate that state law was not to be the guide
for resolving motions under the statute. First, the language of the
statute itself does not refer to state law; instead, it seems to evince
a set of federal concerns regarding the proper allocation of suits
within the federal system. Moreover, at the time section 1404(a)
was adopted, many states did not recogmze the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. Thus, unless the statute was intended to be a
nullity in many parts of the federal court system, Congress must
have envisioned the application of a federal standard to section
1404(a) motions.
The foregoing analysis turns on the fact that section 1404(a)
transfers are entirely the creature of a federal statute. As the next

" 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
For a detailed discussion of Van Dusen and Ferens, see infra notes 103-12 and

accompanying text.
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subsection demonstrates, quite different considerations govern the
relationship between the Erie doctrine and common law forum non
conveniens motions.
2.

Common Law Forum Non Conveniens Motions
a.

The Position of the Case Law

The Supreme Court has never explicitly answered the question
of whether federal or state law governs common law forum non
conveniens motions in the federal courts. Piper Aircraft Co. v
Reyno 3 is suggestive, however. Piper arose out of the crash of a
British-owned aircraft operated by a Scottish air tam service. The
crash occurred in Scotland and killed passengers who were Scottish
citizens. A Califorma attorney persuaded a state probate court to
name his secretary admmstratrix of the decedents' estates. The
attorney then filed wrongful death actions in Califorma state court
against Piper Aircraft Co., which had manufactured the airplane
in Pennsylvania, and Hartzell Propeller, Inc., whose Ohio factory
had manufactured the airplane's propellers. On the defendants'
motion, the action was removed to federal court and transferred
to Pennsylvama pursuant to section 1404(a). Defendants moved to
dismiss the action under the forum non conveniens doctrine, contending that the case should be tried in Scotland. Plaintiff argued
that a dismissal would be unfair because Scottish law was less
favorable to them on the issues of liability, damages, and capacity
to sue. The District Court granted the motion to disrmss, but the
Court of Appeals reversed.
In reviewing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court could have directly confronted the Erie problems
raised by forum non conveniens dismissals. Instead, in reinstating
the trial court judgment, the Court purported not to resolve the
issue. Justice Marshall argued that, with respect to the standards
for forum non conveniens dismissals, federal law and the state
laws of Pennsylvania and California, were "virtually identical." 7 4
Thus, in hsview there was no need to decide whether federal law
or state law governed. However, at the same time the Court did
not cite or discuss any state law precedents that might have been

13

454 U.S. 235 (1981).

74 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981).
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relevant to the specific application of the general test. Thus, implicitly at least, the Piper Court seemed to follow a federal standard
on the forum non convenzens issue.
Numerous lower federal courts have been faced with cases in
which they were unable to conclude that state and federal law were
the same on the issue of forum non conveniens.75 A majority of
the lower federal courts faced with this problem have taken the
position that federal law should control. For example, in the leading case of Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co.,7s the Eleventh Circuit
cited two factors in resolving the Erie issue. First, the opinion
noted that "[t]he doctrine [of forum non conveniens] derives from
the court's inherent power, under Article III of the Constitution,
to control the adminstration of the litigation before it and to
prevent its process from becoming an instrument of abuse, injustice
and oppression. ' 77 Additionally, the court cited its interest in controlling its crowded docket as one basis for a forum non conveniens
78
disrmssal.
The decision to apply federal law has its most dramatic impact
in cases where a section 1404(a) transfer might be available to a
defendant. In those cases, the federal courts have held that the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens was superseded by
section 1404(a), at least where it is possible to transfer to another
federal district court. 79 Thus, in federal courts, the forum non
conventens doctrine generally has been significant only .when the
alternative forum is one to which the case could not have been
transferred-most often the courts of a foreign country
The Sibaja analysis rests largely on a perception that decisions
regarding forum non conveniens motions are basically matters of
" See Robertson & Speck, Access to State Courts in TransnationalPersonal Injury
Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68 Tax. L. Rnv 937 (1990)

(describing situations in which federal law differs from state law on forum non convemens
issue).
757 F.2d 1215 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985).
Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 948 (1985); see also 15 WRioHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3828 at 293-294 (1986).
71 Sibaja, 757 F.2d at 1218; see also In re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d 1147, 115659 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (management of crowded docket noted as a basis for the
inherent power of a court to dismiss on forum non conventens grounds), vacated sub. nom.,
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 109 S. Ct. 1928, aff'd in part and vacated in part,
883 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1989); cf. Speck, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law in
Admiralty: Time for an Overhaul, 18 J. MAR. L. & Coss. 185, 195-96 and n.90 (1987)
(discussing cases reaching dissimilar conclusions through application of various reasomng).
" See, e.g., Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F.2d 100 (1983).
76
7
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judicial housekeeping. To understand the flaw in this approach, a
more detailed explanation of the role of forum non conveniens is
necessary
3.

The Role of Forum Non Conveniens

In recent years, the existing structure of forum non conveniens
analysis has come under heavy criticism from the academic community Commentators contend that the doctrine should be
abolished 0 or, at the very least, incorporated into more structured
"formal jurisdictional doctrine." 81 In fact, the existing flexible
doctrine of forum non convemens performs an important function
in the American judicial system.
Understanding the role of forum non conveniens requires an
examnation of the structure of jurisdictional doctrine generally.
One might want to restrict the court's jurisdiction for two different
types of reasons-nonparty-specific and party-specific. Nonpartyspecific concems-generally grouped under the label "subject matter jurisdiction"-are independent of the interests of the parties
before the court. Party-specific concerns, which are usually incorporated into the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, relate to the
parties before the court.
Limiting the amount of damages that may be claimed before a
small claims court and requiring diversity jurisdiction in federal
courts reflect typical nonparty-specific concerns. The small claims
restriction is intended to preserve the court's resources for other
parties whose claims are within the limits set for the court. The
diversity limitation relates to the desire to limit the scope of federal
power in order to preserve the quasi-sovereign status of the states.
In neither situation are the parties' interests critical to the decision.
The situation is entirely different in the party-specific personal
jurisdiction analysis, where the focus of the analysis is fairness to
the parties. Although concerns about the proper reach of sovereign
authority may influence one's conception of fairness, allocation of
sovereign authority per se is not the focus of this analysis. Thus,
if the parties agree on a forum, party-specific factors will not bar
that forum from hearing the case. Problems arise only if the parties
disagree on the forum. The question then becomes which party's

1 10Stewart, Forum Non Convemens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CAin'. L.
Rav 1259, 1324 (1986).
StStein, supra note 59, at 843.
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preference will prevail. Therefore, the issue is best viewed as one
of the allocation of decision making authority between the parties.
The American system creates a fairly complex hierarchy of
principles to govern this allocation. First, it-envisions a set of fora
in which it would be fair for the defendant to be forced to litigate.
The plaintiff has the power to choose any forum within that set
as the venue for the lawsuit. If the plaintiff chooses a court that
is not within the set of fair fora, the defendant has the right to
veto the plaintiff's choice, but the defendant generally does not
have the right to designate the specific court that will hear the
lawsuit.8 2 The key question is not whether the plaintiff has chosen
the forum that would be most appropriate to hear the lawsuit;
instead, the only issue is whether the court selected by the plaintiff
is included in the set of fair fora.
In devising an approach to this problem, courts and legislatures
have two basic options. One option is to adopt firm, easily administrable rules. The other option is to rely on flexible standards that
take into account a variety of relevant factors. A rules-based
approach has particular appeal in the jurisdictional context. Where
both the parties and the court system have limited resources, expending those resources in jurisdictional disputes, rather than in
resolving the merits, makes little sense. At the same time, even the
best jurisdictional rules are likely to be imperfect; occasionally, the
interaction among a variety of different factors may render the
.assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant unfair Such interactions are difficult to capture in rules without losing the ease of
admimstration that is the major attraction of a rule-based system.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens provides the basis for a
workable compromise. Initially, the jurisdictional inquiry can be
focused on rules; the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the case falls within those rules. Such a demonstration would create
a strong presumption that the court should hear the case. The
burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that special circumstances justify dismissal for forum non conveniens. If the presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice is strong, the forum
non conveniens inquiry will consume relatively few resources; most
motions by the defendant can be dismissed easily The federal
practice of limited appellate review further conserves resources. At
the same time, the availability of forum non conventens gives the

The exception is a situation m which only one forum falls into the set of those that
are "fair" to the defendant.
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courts a safety valve to dismiss particularly strong cases that are
outside the standard jurisdictional rules.
Of course, other approaches to the overall personal jurisdiction
problems are also plausible. Some of these approaches would change
or eliminate the role of forum non conveniens. The key point is
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is an important element
in some jurisdictional schemes and serves a useful role in state
court allocations of decision making authority between plaintiffs
and defendants. Thus, the Erie problems presented in forum non
conventens cases should be analyzed much the same way as those
presented by other jurisdictional rules.
The federal courts have generally held that such issues are
governed by state law 11 This conclusion makes sense in terms of
the general principles that should govern Erie analysis. If a diverse
party was granted access to a federal- court when he would be
denied access to a state court, then the existence of diversity
jurisdiction would alter the balance of power between the parties
in a manner unnecessary to effectuate the principle of equality
Such a result would violate the limited impact theory. Absent
statutory considerations, it should be avoided if possible.
The same considerations indicate that the federal courts should
follow state law in evaluating forum non conveniens motions.
Admittedly, in the context of forum non conventens analysis, such
an approach does create some tension with the principle of equality
State courts generally are much more likely to invoke forum non
conveniens in situations where neither party is a resident of the
forum state&l Thus, a resident of a state may have the option to
invoke the power of a state court where a similarly situated nonresident would have no such option. Such disparities in outcome
might be viewed as presenting the type of problem that diversity
jurisdiction is intended to correct.
This apparent difficulty derives from an overly expansive view
of the principle of equality itself. The comity clause requires states
to allow nonresidents access to their courts in a wide variety of
circumstances. This point should not obscure the fact that the
central mission of the state courts is to provide a forum for
adjudicating claims that involve either their own citizens or activities taking place within state boundaries. The state courts should
be allowed to adopt rules that preserve their resources for this
See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
Stein, supra note 59, at 835 n.236.
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general mission. Once a state has chosen that course, federal courts
in diversity cases should follow the same approach in order to
avoid undermimng the theory of limited impact.
In short, federal courts should adopt state law in dealing with
forum non conveniens motions. This approach should be followed
even if a section 1404(a) transfer motion would be granted. As
previously noted, section 1404(a) transfers have a far more limited
impact than forum non conveniens dismissals-particularly on critical choice of law determinations. Thus, barring a forum non
conveniens dismissal simply because of the existence of'the alternative statutory remedy would seriously damage the theory of
limited impact.
Similar considerations suggest the appropriate limitations of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Stewart Org. Inc. v Ricoh
Corp.85 Ricoh was a diversity action brought in Alabama federal
court by an Alabama copy machine dealer against a New York
manufacturer. The basis of the action was a contract clause that
provided that actions on the contract could be brought only in
New York's Borough of Manhattan court. Relying on this forum
selection clause, the defendant moved for a section 1404(a) transfer
to New York. With only one dissent, the Court held that federal
law governed the question of whether or not to effectuate the
86
forum selection clause through transfer motions.
On the specific facts of the case, the Court's holding in Ricoh
was completely unobjectionable. State courts in Alabama apparently refused to honor forum selection clauses. But given the
premise that federal law is generally applicable to section 1404(a)
motions, this should not be dispositive. Federal transfer motions
are often granted in cases where state courts would refuse to
dismiss, and there is no reason that state treatments of forum
selection clauses should be treated any differently than other state
jurisdictional rules in this context.
The situation becomes more complex in a state where forum
selection clauses are honored. The state's approach to the forum
selection issue should not govern the treatment of a section 1404(a)
motion per se. However, that is only the beginning of the jurisdictional inquiry If the federal courts were to retain jurisdiction of
a case that the courts of the forum state would dismiss, it would
enable a diverse plaintiff to obtain a location for the lawsuit, and
- 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
"

This conclusion is criticized m Freer, supra note 8, at 1090.
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a govermng law, that would be unavailable to him in the absence
of a federal forum. Such a result would clearly be inconsistent
with the theory of limited impact. Thus, where the forum state
would honor a contractual forum selection clause and disnuss a
lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds, the federal courts also should
honor the clause-not because section 1404(a) should be interpreted
to mandate a transfer, but because more general Erie principles
require that conclusion.
In short, the federal courts' treatment of the forum non conveniens issue has shown insufficient sensitivity to the theory of
limited impact. When the courts have dealt with the related issue
of choice of law, other problems have arisen. The next section
examines those problems.

III.

THE ERm DocnuRw

AND CHOICE OF LAW RULES

Choice of law problems create umque difficulties for Erie analysis. Choice of law questions arise after the federal courts have
determined that state law should govern a particular substantive
issue. Like their state court counterparts, the federal courts then
must decide which state's law to apply

A.

The Regime of Klaxon

Klaxon Co. v Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.8 7 is the much-discussed
seminal case. Klaxon was a suit on a New York contract that was
adjudicated in a Delaware federal court. The jury found for the
plaintiff, and awarded him money damages. The question was
whether New York or Delaware law governed the availability of
prejudgment interest. Reversing a lower court judgment that had
made an independent choice of law determination, the Court held
that in diversity cases the decision should be made by reference to
the conflicts rules of the state in which the federal district court
sits.8
In Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v Challoner, 9 the Court was asked
to modify the Klaxon rule. Challoner was a Texas diversity action

- 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
'8 For examples of the voluminous commentary on Klaxon, see Baxter, Choice of
Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. Rnv. 1 (1963-64); Cavers, The Changing Choiceof-Law Processand the FederalCourts, 28 LAW & CONTEmp PROBS. 732 (1963); Hill, supra

note 8, at 557-58, 566-68; Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Law Rules,
39 IND. L.J. 228 (1964).
89 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam).
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arising from the premature explosion of an artillery round in
Cambodia. The artillery round had been manufactured in Texas
by a Maryland corporation, whose principal place of business was
in Pennsylvania. The explosion injured a Wisconsin resident and
killed a Tennessee resident. Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and
Wisconsin all followed the rule that the manufacturer would be
strictly liable in tort. Under Cambodian law, by contrast, the
manufacturer could be held liable only if it had been negligent. 9°
In modem conflicts parlance, Challoner presented a "false
conflict." Since none of the parties had any permanent connection
with Cambodia, Cambodia would be said to have no interest in
the case, and all interested states had the same substantive law
Nonetheless, under Texas conflicts law, Cambodian law would
apply on this point. In such a case, the District Court and the
Court of Appeals both held that the federal courts were entitled
to ignore the Texas choice of law rule and apply the substantive
law of Texas. The Supreme Court reversed, reiterating the principle
that "[a] federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft
onto . . state [choice of law] rules exceptions or modifications
which may commend themselves to the federal court, but which
have not commended themselves to the State in which the federal
court sits." 9' Thus, Klaxon was reaffirmed in the strongest possible
terms.
At the time the Klaxon rule was established, it fit both the
limited impact theory and the principle of equality well. American
courts uniformly followed the approach of the Restatement (First)
of Conflict of Laws in deciding choice of law questions. The First
Restatement rules are based uniformly on a territorial mode of
analysis, and a sharp division exists between substantive and procedural issues. For example, substantive matters of contract validity
are governed by the internal law of the place where the contract
was formed, 92 and substantive issues in tort cases are decided by
reference to the internal law of the place of the injury 91 By
contrast, under the First Restatement, the forum follows its own
rules in deciding procedural points.94 At the margins, the dividing

10Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 512 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated,
423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curtam).
Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam).
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNFLcT OF LAW § 332 (1934).
" Id. at §§ 377-379.
94Id. at § 585.
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line between contract and tort on one hand, and substance and
procedure on the other hand, are sometimes not entirely clear. But
in any event, the citizenshlp of the parties is generally not crucial
to the Restatement analysis. Thus, by adopting state choice of law
rules and by reference, the First Restatement, the federal courts
could be certain that the rights of a nonresident m a diversity
action would be governed by the same legal rules that controlled
the lawsuit of a resident in the courts of the forum state.
The situation has changed dramatically in recent years. Although the First Restatement has been criticized by many academic
commentators, 95 it remains popular with many state courts. 96 However, spurred by scholarly criticism, other state courts have begun
experimenting. with different approaches to choice of law analysis.
Some states have adopted the "most significant relationship" test
of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws;97 others follow
various forms of interest analysis; 98 still others have focused on the
"better law" approach;19 and the approach of some states simply
defies easy characterization. 100 Unlike the First Restatement, some
of the more modern systems focus explicitly on the residence of
the parties as a determming factor in choice of law analysis, giving
more favorable treatment to resident parties than nonresident parties.10
Ely suggests that conflicts systems that favor residents over
nonresidents violate the comity clause.e 2 Although tlus conclusion
is somewhat extreme, it was clearly the possibility of such discrimination that prompted the Constitutional Convention to provide

91E.g., W Coox, THE LoicA AND LEGAL BASiS Or THE Couar OF LAws (1942);
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON TaHCONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
The approaches of various states to choice of law issues are surveyed in Smith,
Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HAST. L.J. 1041 (1987).
97E.g., Gnggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
E.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719 (1976) (comparative

impairment analysis), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d
543 (Ore. 1964) (pure interest analysis).
E.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973); Hunker v. Royal Indemnity
Co., 204 N.W.2d 897 (Wisc. 1973).
10 E.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972) (rules embodying elements
of territonalism, interest analysis; and RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws);

Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1970) (combination of territonalism and interest
analysis).

101See, e.g., Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969) (guest statute); Hart v.
American Airlines, Inc., 304 N.Y.S.2d 810 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (collateral estoppel rules).
102Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in ProtectingIts Own, 23 WM. & MARY
L. REv 173 (1981).
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for diversity jurisdiction, in the federal courts. Thus, in order to

fulfill their constitutional function, the federal courts should modify their approach to problems of choice of law in diversity cases.
Rather than simply applying the choice of law analysis of the
forum state on issues that are governed by state law, on nonjurisdictional issues the federal courts should apply the law that
would have been adopted by the forum state if the party choosing
the federal forum had been a resident of that state.
This change in approach would have no impact on results where
the forum had adopted an approach to choice of law analysis that
does not base results on the residence of the parties. The new rule
would make a difference, however, in .the federal courts' role in
states applying interest analysis or related methodologies. In those
states, the federal courts would gain the ability to effectuate the
policies underlying the diversity clause by guaranteeing that nonresidents would have the opportunity to avoid discrmination against
them by the state courts. Admittedly, the suggested modification
would increase the likelihood of forum shopping by nonresident
parties. But it is precisely the type of forum shopping envisioned
by those who drafted the diversity clause.
B.

Choice of Law and Section 1404(a) Transfers

The availability of section 1404(a) transfer motions increases
the potential complexity of the choice of law problems faced by
the federal courts in diversity actions. The Supreme Court first
dealt with the issue in Van Dusen v. Barrack.10 3 Van Dusen arose
from the crash of a commercial aircraft en route from Boston,
Massachusetts to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In the wake -of the
crash, more than 100 negligence actions were filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and more
than 45 were filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On motion by the defendant, the
Pennsylvania court applied section 1404(a) and transferred the
actions begun in Pennsylvania to the Massachusetts court. The
question in Van Dusen was what effect the transfer would have on
the choice of law govermng the actions originally instituted in
Pennsylvania.
The Van Dusen Court held unanimously that Pennsylvania law
governed those actions. The opinion first focused on the equality

376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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justification for the Erie doctrine, noting that the basic purpose of
the doctrine was to "ensure that the 'accident' of federal diversity
jurisdiction does not enable a party
to achieve a result in
federal court which could not have been achieved in the courts of
the State where the action was filed."' 1 The Court further noted
that if the law of the transferee forum was applied in cases such
as Van Dusen, a party subject to suit in the transferor forum could
invoke section 1404(a) to gain the benefits of the law of the
transferee state. 10 5 Thus, the Court concluded that the law of the
transferor state provided the appropriate rules to govern transferred
actions. 106
The holding in Van Dusen was explicitly limited to situations
in which the transfer was initiated on motionof the defendant.' °7
In Ferens v John Deere Co.,10 the Court extended the rule to

cover cases in which the plaintiff initiated the transfer. In Ferens,
the plaintiff lost a hand after allegedly catching it in a harvester
manufactured by the defendant Delaware corporation. The accident
occurred in Pennsylvania. More than two years after the accident,
the plaintiff raised contract and warranty claims in a diversity
action in a Pennsylvania federal court. The plaintiff also filed a
tort action in a Mississippi federal court. The actions were split
because Pennsylvania had a two year statute of limitations for tort
actions, while Mississippi had a six year statute of limitations. On
plaintiff's section 1404(a) motion, the Mississippi action was trans-

ferred to Pennsylvania district court.
A closely-divided Supreme Court held that the Mississippi statute of limitations would continue to govern the transferred tort
action. Speaking for the majority, Justice Kennedy rejected the
argument that the Court's interpretation of section 1404(a) would
unduly encourage forum shopping, noting that the plaintiff already
had the option of proceeding in either Mississippi or Pennsylvania
court.'09 Kennedy also argued that a contrary view "would undermine the Erie rule in a serious way"" 0 by allowing a transfer under
,,
105

Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964).

Id.

,o6For diffenng perspectives on Van Dusen, see Cume, Change of Venue and the
Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Cm. L. REv 341 (1960); Note, Choice of Law After
Transfer of Venue, 75 YALE L.J. 90 (1965).
' Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 640.
- U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990).
,o Ferens v. John Deere Co., U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1282 (1990).
110Id. at 1281.
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section 1404(a) to change the state law applicable in a diversity
case. He further contended that reqmring the plaintiff to pursue
his suit in an inconvement forum in order to obtain favorable law
would impose unnecessary costs on the federal court system."'
Thus, the majority concluded that applying the law of the transferor forum "effects the appropriate balance between fairness and
simplicity 1"112

Proper analysis of the relationship between section 1404(a),
choice of law, and the Erie doctrine is relatively straightforward.
Section 1404(a) motions are not available to state court litigants;
thus, their existence threatens to substantially reallocate authority
between plaintiffs and defendants on the matters normally related
to choice of forum. As already noted, a federal standard properly
governs the decision of a court on the question of whether to grant
a section 1404(a) motion. For Erie purposes, the question is how
best to limit the tension between the existence of transfers and the
theory of limited impact.
Given the need for a federal standard, the Court's approach
to the effect of section 1404(a) transfers imtiated by defendants is
entirely consistent with the limited impact theory Allowing a defendant to force transfer reallocates the decision making power
between the parties by giving the defendant a new veto power over
the plaintiff's choice of forum, but by holding that a transfer of
defendant's motion will not change the applicable law, Van Dusen
ensures that such a transfer will have no other effects.
The extension of Van Dusen to plaintiff-mitiated transfers cannot be defended in similar terms. As the Ferens majority noted,
allowing the plaintiff to move the courtroom from the transferor
forum to the transferee forum by its terms has no impact on the
allocation of authority between the parties because, by defintion,
the transferee forum was one in which the plaintiff could have
filed the action as an initial matter.13 Application of the Ferens
rule, by contrast, gives the plaintiff an option that he would not
have had in the absence of federal diversity junsdiction-the right
to litigate in the transferee state under the legal regime of the
transferor state. The Ferens majority argued that this advantage
I' Id.
"2 Id. at 1284.
Justices Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented..Id. at 1284-88 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).
113 Id.

at 1282.
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was not "legal," but rather territorial. 14 Such distinctions, however, are not relevant to the theory of limited impact that should
guide Erie analysis. Moreover, application of the law of the transferee forum in Ferens-type cases would not threaten any federal
policy embodied in the transfer statute. Therefore, unlike Van
Dusen, Ferens should be viewed as incorrectly decided.
CONCLUSION

The analysis of the choice of forum and choice of law issues
illustrates the benefits of an approach to Erie problems that focuses
on the conflicting demands of the limited impact theory and the
principle of equality The suggested approach would greatly improve judicial performance in this area. Rather than directing the
attention of the federal judiciary to talismanic phrases or illusory
comparisons of the relative importance of state and federal interests, such an approach would focus the courts' attention directly
on the policies underlying both the grant of diversity jurisdiction
and the Constitution as a whole. Admittedly, no easily described
system will yield simple answers to all Erie-related issues. Consistent application of the suggested analysis, however, would generate
a more coherent, easily-understood body of precedent determining
the boundaries between state and federal law

"4

Id. at 1280.

